More than 100,000 cameras are reading license plates: What I said on N+ Univision

On August 21, 2026, I joined Vilma Tarazona on N+ Univision to talk about Flock Safety’s network of automatic license-plate readers — cameras that photograph vehicles as they pass, store those sightings, and make them searchable by police and other customers.[1]
The question she opened with is the one a lot of people were asking: can those cameras be used to check someone’s immigration status? I posted the conversation to my YouTube channel on August 24. The quotes below are taken from that recording.
What the cameras actually collect
Flock Safety sells automatic license-plate readers, often shortened to ALPRs. According to the company’s own privacy documentation, a Flock ALPR captures a license-plate image, visible vehicle characteristics, a date and time, and the camera’s location. Flock says the system does not collect biometric data, driver information, or facial-recognition data, and that it does not identify people by their faces.[2]
The company’s customers include police departments, but not only police departments. As I put it on the air:
“Esto se le ha vendido a los departamentos de policía, a comunidades privadas, a dueños de negocios privados”
“This has been sold to police departments, to private communities, to private business owners.”[3]
I described the resulting network this way:
“esto es una red nacional, estamos hablando de más de 100,000 cámaras a través de todo el país interconectadas, ligadas a una base de datos e instaladas sin una orden judicial”
“this is a national network, we’re talking about more than 100,000 cameras throughout the entire country, interconnected, tied to a database and installed without a court order.”[3]
The camera count was in line with reporting from that month. In early August 2026, AFP wrote that Flock had, in only a few years, installed more than 100,000 license-plate reader cameras in the United States. Two days after I recorded the segment, Sen. Josh Hawley, citing the company’s own figures, wrote that Flock “boasts more than 120,000 cameras across 49 states and more than 20 billion vehicle scans every month.”[4][5]
“Installed without a court order” refers to the fact that these cameras photograph vehicles in public and that searches of the resulting database are typically described, in reporting, as being done without a warrant. That is a description of current practice, not a claim that the law could never require one.[6][4]
A sighting in the database is a record that a particular vehicle was at a particular camera at a particular time. It is not, by itself, a file on the driver. That distinction matters for the immigration question Vilma asked, and I will come back to it.
Flock says customers own the data their cameras collect, set their own retention period, and can choose whether to share it. The company has recommended a short default — in some materials a seven-day window, in others 30 days — after which, it says, data is deleted unless it has been saved as evidence. Retention is ultimately a local policy decision, not a single nationwide number.[2]
How police use the network — and how it has been misused
Police departments use ALPR networks to look for stolen cars, vehicles tied to AMBER or Silver alerts, and cars that may be connected to a crime. Flock and some police officials describe those uses as the point of the system. In Richmond, Virginia, a police official told AFP that for practically any crime involving a vehicle, investigators will query the database; he described a 2026 homicide case in which an alert on a fleeing suspect’s plate led to an arrest in a neighboring county.[4] Flock also says the technology has been used to help locate missing people, including through AMBER Alert integrations.[7]
The same searchable history can be used for reasons that have nothing to do with a criminal case. I said on the air that that had already happened:
“ya se han reportado casos de eh oficiales que han tenido acceso a la base de datos y lo han utilizado por razones personales para buscar, por ejemplo, a a una enamorada en un caso más de 100 veces buscando a esta persona”
“cases have already been reported of officers who have had access to the database and have used it for personal reasons to search, for example, for a girlfriend — in one case more than 100 times, looking for this person.”[3]
That description matches reporting that was already public when we spoke. In February 2026, Milwaukee prosecutors charged police officer Josue Ayala with attempted misconduct in public office, alleging that he used his department’s Flock access, while on duty, to search his romantic partner’s license plate 124 times and her former partner’s plate 55 times, entering “investigation” as the reason each time. According to the criminal complaint, as reported by WISN, the misuse was discovered after one of the people involved checked a plate on a public website, not by Flock’s own audit tools. Milwaukee’s police chief said the department suspended Ayala and later said he would resign.[8][5]
That case was not an isolated anecdote. On August 2, 2026, The Washington Post reported that at least 50 law enforcement officers had been charged with or accused of misusing Flock or similar systems, most often to monitor romantic partners or former partners. AFP summarized that investigation later the same month.[9][4]
Flock says every search is logged, that searches require a recorded public-safety reason, and that supervisors can review those logs.[2] The Milwaukee case is an example of why a log is not the same thing as an effective check: the officer filled in a reason, and the pattern was not caught internally.
ICE, local police, and “side-door” access
Vilma asked whether the people who use these cameras can check a driver’s immigration status. The short answer I gave is that Flock’s system identifies vehicles, not people. A plate can still be crossed with other records — motor-vehicle files, hotlists, or a federal database — to identify a registered owner or to flag a vehicle that an agency is looking for. That is a chain of queries, not a camera that “knows” anyone’s immigration status on its own.
I also said that Immigration and Customs Enforcement has obtained information from the network without a direct contract with Flock:
“han sido utilizadas por ICE indirectamente porque ICE no tiene un contrato directo con Flock, la compañía que crea estas cámaras, han sido utilizadas por ICE para a as han sido accedidas, pero a través de los departamentos de policía, es decir, como un acceso lateral a a estas cámaras.”
“they have been used by ICE indirectly because ICE does not have a direct contract with Flock, the company that makes these cameras; they have been accessed, but through police departments, that is, as a lateral access to these cameras.”[3]
Flock’s public position is consistent with the first half of that sentence. In a January 2026 post, later updated, the company wrote: “Flock does not work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).” It says it has no contract with ICE, that ICE does not have direct access to Flock cameras or data unless a local customer “expressly and deliberately” allows it, and that sharing with federal agencies is off by default.[7]
The second half is also documented. In May 2025, 404 Media reviewed search logs obtained from the Danville, Illinois, Police Department and found more than 4,000 nationwide and statewide lookups in which local and state officers entered reasons such as “ICE,” “immigration,” “ICE WARRANT,” and “ICE+ERO.” The reporters wrote that this gave federal law enforcement “side-door access” to a tool it did not have a formal contract for.[6] The fact-checking site Factchequeado, citing that reporting and The Associated Press, reached the same distinction: Flock says it has no contract with ICE or CBP and does not share data with them directly, but local agencies can choose to share, and both ICE and Border Patrol have obtained information that way.[10]
I described how those requests can look from the local side:
“ellos están llegando a los departamentos de policía pidiéndoles acceso y cuando le el policía entra en la base de datos, cuál es la razón por la que están accediendo esta información, le están poniendo ICE. Es lo único que están dejando saber. Es decir, que es completamente descontrolado este acceso y completamente fuera, en mi opinión, del proceso judicial.”
“they are going to police departments asking them for access, and when the officer enters the database, [for] the reason they are accessing this information, they are putting ICE. That is all they are making known. In other words, this access is completely uncontrolled and completely outside, in my opinion, the judicial process.”[3]
The Electronic Frontier Foundation later documented a related mechanism: Flock customers can subscribe to FBI National Crime Information Center hotlists, including an “Immigration Violator” list that, according to the NCIC operator manual, is populated exclusively by ICE and can include plates tied to administrative warrants issued without judicial review. If a local agency enables that topic, the local agency — not ICE automatically, Flock has said — receives the alert when a matching plate is seen.[11]
The ACLU has also warned that Flock’s default customer agreement has included language granting the company a license to disclose agency data “for investigative purposes,” unless a department negotiates that language out, and that a large share of law-enforcement customers have enrolled in Flock’s national lookup tool.[12]
None of that proves that a particular stop was based on a Flock hit. Vilma raised reports, which her team said they had already aired, of Border Patrol arrests in Florida in which people were told a plate had been associated with an irregular immigration status. I have not independently verified those specific incidents here, and I am not going to treat a correspondent’s on-air summary as a finding. The documented pattern is the one above: no direct Flock-to-ICE contract, and repeated examples of federal access through local agencies.
What artificial intelligence changes — and what it does not
Vilma noted that license-plate readers have been used for many years, and asked what was new about adding artificial intelligence. I said the change is speed and scale:
“la inteligencia artificial puede correlacionar millones de puntos de datos simultáneamente y llegar a conclusiones que sencillamente es prácticamente imposible hacerlo de una manera manual”
“artificial intelligence can correlate millions of data points simultaneously and reach conclusions that it is simply practically impossible to reach manually.”[3]
Flock’s cameras do not only read a plate. They classify visible features of the vehicle — make, color, body type, and, in some descriptions, other details such as damage or a spare tire — and they attach a time and a place. I said they can “reconocer las placas, reconocer el tipo de auto, correlacionarlo con el lugar donde está, la hora” — recognize the plates, recognize the type of car, and correlate that with the location and the time.[3][2]
I also mentioned facial recognition as something that could later be applied to images a camera has already collected. When Vilma asked directly whether these cameras can, at any given second, use facial recognition to know who is on the street, I was more precise:
“en realidad no se ha documentado el la utilización de reconocimiento facial, pero el hecho de que la cámara está tomando toda esta información potencialmente podría ser utilizada”
“in reality the use of facial recognition has not been documented, but the fact that the camera is capturing all this information means it could potentially be used.”[3]
That is the line I want to leave in place. Flock says its ALPR system does not use facial recognition and does not collect biometric or driver data.[2] I did not claim, on the air, that Flock is running face identification on drivers. I said that use had not been documented, and that the pile of stored images is itself the problem, because how the data might be used later is a separate question.
Flock has added more restrictions on searches — required reasons, filters in some states, and other administrative controls. I was skeptical that paperwork, by itself, solves a system that already grants access:
“ahora inclusive con las nuevas restricciones que ha puesto Flo para acceder a la a los datos, es como sencillamente decirle ahora al zorro que tiene que llenar una planilla para entrar al gallinero, pero al final el problema es que el zorro tiene acceso al gallinero.”
“now, even with the new restrictions Flock has put in place to access the data, it is like simply telling the fox that it now has to fill out a form to enter the henhouse, but in the end the problem is that the fox has access to the henhouse.”[3]
(“Flo” in the automatic transcript is Flock.)
Where this lands
I was not there to say that license-plate readers have no legitimate investigative use. They are used to look for stolen cars and for people police are already seeking, and some departments credit them with helping to close cases. I was there to say what the system is, at the scale it has now reached, and what it is not.
It is a national, interconnected network of cameras sold to police, private communities and businesses. It stores a history of where vehicles have been. It does not, by itself, know who is behind the wheel or what that person’s immigration status is. Federal agencies have obtained information from it through local police even without a direct contract. Officers have also used it for personal searches. And once a network like that exists, it is hard to take apart:
“las cosas comienzan con buenas intenciones, como vamos a a tratar de buscar autos robados o personas que que estamos buscando que han cometido crímenes, pero por supuesto, crean una red de vigilancia nacional interconectada que después es muy difícil de desmontar.”
“things begin with good intentions, like we’re going to try to look for stolen cars or people we’re looking for who have committed crimes, but of course they create an interconnected national surveillance network that is later very difficult to dismantle.”[3]
References
- N+ Univision (August 21, 2026; updated August 22, 2026). "¿Cómo funcionan las cámaras Flock? El debate por la privacidad y el uso de lectores de placas por agentes de inmigración." Report by Vilma Tarazona. https://www.univision.com/noticias/como-funcionan-las-camaras-flock-el-debate-por-la-privacidad-y-el-uso-de-lectores-de-placas-por-agentes-de-inmigracion-video. The segment was also posted to YouTube on August 24, 2026, at 10:20 a.m. EDT: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ONfQd4QU3K4.
- Flock Safety. "How Flock Protects and Manages Data" (Data Privacy & Protection). Describes ALPR data collected (plate images, vehicle characteristics, date and time, camera location), data not collected (biometrics, driver information, facial-recognition data), customer-controlled retention, and the company's statement that the system does not use facial recognition. https://www.flocksafety.com/trust/data-privacy.
- Automatic Spanish captions from the YouTube upload of the N+ Univision interview, August 24, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ONfQd4QU3K4, video ID ONfQd4QU3K4, duration 5:31. YouTube listed no manual transcript; the quoted Spanish is taken verbatim from the automatic caption track, typographical and recognition errors included. English translations are mine. Timestamps: "red nacional" / "más de 100,000 cámaras" at 0:00:33; "vendido a los departamentos de policía" at 0:00:44; personal-use searches at 0:01:02; ICE "acceso lateral" at 0:01:16; officers entering "ICE" as a search reason at 0:02:44; AI correlating data at 0:03:29; the fox-and-henhouse comparison at 0:04:16; facial recognition "no se ha documentado" at 0:04:44; "red de vigilancia nacional" at 0:05:01.
- AFP (August 9, 2026). "Angers mounts in US over vast network of car license plate cams." France 24. Reports that Flock had installed more than 100,000 license-plate reader cameras in the United States; quotes Richmond police official Jon Bridges on investigative use, including a homicide case; and notes that searches can be done without warrants. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260809-angers-mounts-in-us-over-vast-network-of-car-license-plate-cams.
- Hawley, Sen. Josh (August 26, 2026). Letter to Flock Safety CEO Garrett Langley, and the accompanying Senate announcement. Cites Flock's figures of more than 120,000 cameras across 49 states and more than 20 billion vehicle scans a month, and the Milwaukee case in which an officer allegedly searched his girlfriend's plate 124 times and her former boyfriend's plate 55 times. https://www.hawley.senate.gov/chairman-hawley-investigates-ai-powered-flock-cameras-amidst-privacy-concerns/.
- Koebler, Jason, and Joseph Cox (May 27, 2025). "ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows." 404 Media. Documents more than 4,000 lookups with reasons such as "ICE," "immigration," and "ICE WARRANT," obtained from Danville, Illinois, Police Department logs, and describes searches as typically conducted without a warrant. https://www.404media.co/ice-taps-into-nationwide-ai-enabled-camera-network-data-shows/.
- Flock Safety (published January 6, 2026; page also bears a later update). "Does Flock Share Data With ICE? Here's Flock's Answer." States that Flock does not work with or have a contract with ICE, that federal sharing is off by default, and that local customers control access. Also describes public-safety uses, including AMBER Alert / missing-person work. https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/does-flock-share-data-with-ice.
- Stratton, James (February 24, 2026). "Milwaukee police officer charged, accused of misusing license plate tracking system." WISN. Summarizes the criminal complaint against Officer Josue Ayala: 124 searches of his partner's plate and 55 of her former partner's plate, reason entered as "investigation," discovered after a plate lookup on a public website. https://www.wisn.com/article/milwaukee-police-officer-charged-accused-of-misusing-license-plate-tracking-system/70485982.
- The Washington Post (August 2, 2026). "How rogue officers turned a nationwide camera network into a tool for stalking." Reported that at least 50 law enforcement officers had been charged with or accused of misusing Flock or similar systems. The article is paywalled; the finding and headline are cited here as summarized by AFP in the August 9, 2026 dispatch above, and confirmed by the Post URL and headline in public references to the investigation. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2026/08/02/how-police-officers-used-vast-network-cameras-spy-their-exes/.
- Pulla, Jonnathan (December 3, 2025). "¿Se usan las cámaras de tráfico Flock para operativos de inmigración? Esto es lo que sabemos." Factchequeado. Notes that Flock says it has no contract with DHS agencies and does not share data with them directly, while local agencies can share, and that ICE and Border Patrol have obtained information that way, citing 404 Media and The Associated Press. https://factchequeado.com/teexplicamos/20251203/camaras-flock-inmigracion-deportaciones/.
- Maass, Dave (June 25, 2026). "Are Your Local Police Using Flock Safety ALPRs to Scan for Immigrants?" Electronic Frontier Foundation. Describes Flock's NCIC hotlist-topic menu, including the ICE-populated "Immigration Violator" list, and Flock's statement that ICE itself does not automatically receive the alert. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/are-your-local-police-using-flock-safety-alprs-scan-immigrants.
- American Civil Liberties Union. "Flock Can Share Driver-Surveillance Data Even When Police Departments Opt Out, And Other Flock Developments." Describes default contract language on disclosure "for investigative purposes" and enrollment in Flock's national lookup tool, citing ACLU of Massachusetts open-records work and Flock's statement to Sen. Ron Wyden that 75% of law-enforcement customers had enrolled. https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/flock-massachusetts-and-updates.